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Reservation policy in local governments – Gram Panchayats – in India is one of three key means 
of affirmative action, ensuring lower caste groups are represented fairly in political institutions. 
Researchers have found local political reservations for Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled 
Tribe (ST) populations strongly associated with more SC- and ST-friendly policies, increases in 
welfare spending and investment in infrastructure, as well as lower household poverty levels. 
This paper explores one potential indirect benefit of reservations, namely improvements in 
education attainment. The theory of role model effects is applied to the context of political 
reservations - greater presence of SC and ST presidents in Gram Panchayats could act as a 
positive role model of stereotype-defying success for SC and ST children, incentivizing more 
investment in education attainment. The paper tests the relationship between reservation rates 
and average completed years of schooling in a dose-response regression model at the sub-district 
level, using a sample of 13,408 SC children and 6,066 ST children ages 5 to 18 in Karnataka. 
The results of the analysis suggest that more SC and ST presidents in Gram Panchayats are 
associated with increases in education attainment among SC and ST children. Further research 







The socially and religiously-imbedded caste system in India created schisms among the 
Indian population, forming large groups of ethnic and caste minorities. Scheduled Castes (SC), 
Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Class (OBC) constitute about half of the country’s 
population.1 Due to beliefs that the historically low castes are impure by birth and association 
with stigmatized occupations such as butchers and day laborers, the lower castes - SC, ST, and 
OBC – have been socioeconomically marginalized.2  
Recognizing issues of discrimination against the three minority caste groups, early forms 
of positive discrimination policies were put in place by the British during its colonial rule. In 
1892 special schools were established for SCs and in 1944 a five-year budget of 300,000 rupees 
were set aside for these students. The British also introduced political representation quotas in 
1919 and hiring quotas for civil service in 1934.3 The Indian Constitution of 1950 formalized 
legal protection against discrimination on the basis of caste, serving as the foundational 
document for affirmative action protecting SC, ST, and OBC groups through Articles 16, 17, 29, 
and 46.4  
The reservation policy today takes three main forms: reservations for positions in local 
governments, civil service jobs, and in educational institutions. Seats in the local governments – 
Gram Panchayats (GP) – are saved for SC, ST, and OBC candidates proportionally to the 
group’s population share to overcome underrepresentation of these marginalized groups in 
political institutions. Reservations for civil service jobs are facilitated through relaxation of 
minimum age restrictions, required qualifications, and lower application fees. The policy also 
provides equal footing for SC and ST applicants through pre-examination training and separate 
interviews. Lastly admission to educational institutions are reserved for SC and ST students 
through scholarships, grants, special housing, and concessions in fees as well as academic 
support.5 This paper focuses on the first form of reservation policy, enforced by the 73rd and 74th 
Amendment of the Constitution in 1993, mandating greater representation of SC and ST 
populations in the local governments.6 
 Despite the policy’s intention to alleviate caste-based discrimination, reservation policy 
has at times been a point of contention among the public. Reservations in various institutions 
sparked debate on whether the policies have positive outcomes for society or merely provide an 
unfair advantage for SC, ST, or OBC individuals. There have been significant research 
conducted on the impact of the reservations in the last decade, but the impact evaluation in the 
literature is limited in the variety effects studied.  The focus of evaluation has been on direct 
outcomes of policies implemented by GPs – spending, public goods, infrastructure, and poverty. 
On the other hand, specific areas of well-being such as health and education, which may be 
indirectly impacted by reservations, are yet to be fully developed. Considering the high level of 
growth and development the Indian economy has seen, it is important to evaluate the impact of 
the reservation policy as a means for inclusive growth. To explore the impact of reservations at 
the local government level, this paper examines how SC and ST children’s education attainment 





Gram Panchayats and Reservation Policy 
GP represent a group of villages through direct election and are in charge of 
administering local public goods, transfer programs, and of managing local civil servants. Each 
GP consists of general council members and leaders, namely the president and vice president. 
The elected council serves for a period of five years. There are a few key components of the 
reservation policy that allows researchers to study the impact of the policy.7 For this paper we 
focus on the reservation of presidencies, but the same rules apply for GP seats for the general 
council member elections. 
GP reservations are based on the census and are allocated randomly. The number of 
Gram Panchayats assigned reserved presidencies in a given taluk must reflect that taluk’s SC or 
ST population shares recorded from the most recent census, which is taken every decade. The 
reservations are randomly allocated among the Gram Panchayats in the taluk as long as any 
given presidency is not reserved for the same category for two consecutive election years.8 This 
random assignment of reservation within taluks creates exogenous variation external to the 
policy itself, and allows differences in outcomes between GPs with and without reserved 
presidencies can be attributed to the reservation policy.  
 
 
II. Literature Review 
 Researchers have studied the impact of reservations on policy outcomes, public goods, 
other household benefits, and household poverty levels. Over the last decade researchers have 
continued to expand the subject from the policies implemented by the GPs and their 
expenditures, to the result of these policies and expenditures in public goods provided to 
households and poverty levels.  
 The first group of research considers the types of policies that are created when political 
reservations are in place. Pande focuses on the effect of minority representation in state 
legislature on policy outcomes. Using state-level panel data of 16 major states from 1960 to 
1992, she analyzes the impact of SC and ST reservations on total spending, education spending, 
job quotas, and ST welfare spending.  She concludes that increasing minority representation 
increases policies concerning transfers for minority groups. ST reservation increases spending on 
ST welfare programs, while lowers education and overall government spending. SC reservation 
also increases the share of government jobs for minorities.9  
Similarly, Duflo et al. studies the district of Birbhum, West Bengal in 2000 using 
interviews with villagers and GP presidents. The authors survey investments in local public 
goods provided since 1993 in various hamlets that were randomly assigned SC/ST reservations 
of GP presidents. The study finds that while SC presidents allocate more public goods to SC 
hamlets and the share of investments in SC hamlets are 10% higher, reservations did not affect 
the mix of public goods that are provided. Thus reservation policy enables preference of 
recipients but not of the goods themselves.10  
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Others have studied the effects of reservations public goods and household benefits. 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo use village level data in West Bengal and Rajasthan, but focus on one 
third of the presidency seats reserved for women and their subsequent policy decisions. Between 
2000 and 2002 results show that women presidents in reserved seats invest more in public goods 
according to the local women’s preferences – namely drinking water and roads in West Bengal 
and drinking water for Rajasthan. Though there is no significant impact found on benefits for 
female-headed households, the authors prove that mechanisms based on identities and gender 
can have significant impacts on policy decisions.11   
 Shifting the focus to goods and services received by households, Besley et al. analyze 
household and village level data for the impact of reservations for GP presidents in Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu on household benefits received. From September to 
November 2002, they find that SC and ST reservations in GPs increase private household 
benefits such as construction of houses and toilets, in addition to water and electricity 
connections. However public goods and infrastructure including construction of roads increase in 
the area of the presidents regardless of reservations.12 A similar study by Bardhan et al. finds in 
West Bengal that among 69 villages between 2003 and 2005, SC and ST reservations increase 
household benefits, especially toilets. Tracking GP expenditures, the increase in benefits for 
SC/ST households most often was a result of a diversion of employment benefits from landless 
non-SC/ST to SC/ST households.13 Bardhan’s updated paper finds no positive impact of 
women’s reservation and mixed results for SC/ST reservations in GPs on targeting of specific 
programs. The mixed findings of the latter is largely attributable to the insignificance of effects 
of SC and ST reservations when combined.14 
The most recent study determines the policy impact on the well-being of households. 
Chin and Prakash use reservation shares in 16 states SC and ST seats to study the effect of GP 
reservations on household poverty levels. The paper adds to previous research by quantifying the 
overall effect of the policy on rural, urban, and aggregate poverty. The methodology is based on 
poverty headcount per ratio and a poverty gap index to measure the percentage of the population 
below the poverty line as well as the magnitude of poverty. The study finds that while there are 
significant reductions in poverty for STs, SCs do not experience the same results, potentially due 
to the homogenous living environment and geographic isolation of many ST hamlets.15 
 
Table 1. Previous Literature on Reservation Policy Impact 
Authors Region Time Frame Outcomes Measured 
Pande 16 states 1960-1992 
State-level total spending, education spending, 
ST welfare spending, job quotas 




Rajasthan 2000-2002 Investment in local public goods 




Household benefits received, public goods, 
infrastructure 
Bradhan et al. West Bengal 2003-2005 
Household benefits received, Gram Panchayat 
expenditure 
Chin & Prakash 16 states 1960-2000 Household poverty levels 
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 These studies analyze the effect of reservations on policy decisions, provision of public 
goods and benefits, as well as household poverty. Research has shown that reservations often 
create policies geared towards benefiting disadvantaged groups and that benefits received by the 
targeted households increases. However how reservations affect the daily lives of disadvantaged 
households in less direct ways is unclear. This paper seeks to evaluate the effect of GP 
reservations on education attainment among the SC and ST children. 
 
 
III. Role Model Effects in Reservations 
When discussing the more indirect impacts of reservations and quotas of leadership 
positions, researchers highlight social mechanisms that may be at work. Group identities such as 
caste and gender can be seen as socially constructed identities in sociology and social cognitive 
theory. 16 Role incongruities that arise from these social identities create stereotypes that feed 
into a gap in beliefs and aspirations. For example, individuals belonging to the Scheduled Caste 
group are historically associated with impure occupations.17 Such stereotypes can perpetuate into 
beliefs that SC individuals do not need education or find success worthy of investment in 
education. The presence of role models, in this case GP presidents, could help reduce the gap in 
achievement or aspirations, by acting as role models exemplifying potential future success for 
other SC and STs. This idea has been applied in the context of the U.S. and in India.  
Marx et al. studies the “Obama Effect” on race-based performance in verbal problem-
solving ability at four key times over the course of Obama’s presidential campaign and election. 
The four times are: before the convention, after the convention speech, between speech and 
election, and after the election. These are selected to present an increasing range of media 
exposure and success to the students. Researchers find that as Obama’s stereotype-defying 
accomplishment became more apparent through the four major time frames, African American 
student’s performance in the exams improved significantly. By the fourth exam after Obama’s 
presidential election, the African American student exam performance was equivalent to the 
White American students, who had been much better in performance previously. 18 
Similarly in India, Beaman et al. test the impact of female leaders in village of West 
Bengal on educational aspirations and attainment for girls. Under the reservation policy, one-
third of local government seats are randomly selected to be reserved for women. The authors find 
that the presence of female leaders improve the educational aspirations and attainment for girls. 
More girls in villages with reserved female leaders are likely to aspire to graduate and receive 
higher education than those in villages without female leaders. Girls in villages that had two 
reservations for female leaders are associated with 0.6 higher grades completed than others. The 
study concludes after robustness checks that the role model effect of female leaders exceed the 
changes created by coinciding policy and infrastructure changes. Thus the study confirms the 
idea that reservations can help provide role models and new opportunities for disadvantaged 
groups. 19 
Building on these previous studies, this paper evaluates whether similar role model 
effects can be found in GPs for SC and ST presidents. The main hypothesis is that the more 
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cumulative SC presidency reservations, the higher the years of schooling will be for SC children 
at the taluk level due to the positive role model effects. Similarly greater cumulative ST 
presidency reservations will be linked to higher years of schooling for ST children. Greater 
presence of SC/ST leaders through GP presidency reservations  provide more positive role 




IV. Research Methodology 
Taking advantage of the exogenous variation, the impact of reservation policy on 
education attainment is estimated through a dose-response regression model. This model 
analyzes the relationship between taluk-level reservation rates on completed years of schooling 
in 2004 and 2008. It specifies reservations to SC presidencies and the impact on SC children, 
then with ST presidencies and children. The functional form of the model is: 
Years of Schooling =  β0 + β1𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + β2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2008 
+β3(𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2008) + β4𝐴𝑔𝑒 + β5𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒
+ β6𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝜀 
Completed years of schooling is set to be a function of the cumulative reservation rate of 
SC/ST presidency reservation, the indicator for year 2008, and the interaction between the 
cumulative reservation rate and the 2008 indicator to capture any difference of the policy impact 
in 2004 versus 2008. The model also controls age, gender, and household assets to accurately 
isolate the reservations’ effect on education attainment. The household asset index is created 
using household ownership of nine assets common to both waves of the DLHS survey (fan, 
radio, television, sewing machine, phone, bicycle, motorcycle or scooter, car, and tractor). Once 
the raw index score is created, the sample is categorized into four groups based on the raw index 
score to be equally distributed. The household asset index allows the model to control for 




Education and Reservation Data 
Information on education attainment comes from the second and third series of the 
District Level Household and Facility Survey (DLHS) from years 2004 and 2008 respectively. 
DLHS is one of the largest demographic and health surveys initiated by the Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare in India, containing household and village level information for all districts. 
For each wave of the survey 50 rural and urban primary sampling units (PSU) are selected 
independently in each district, in proportion to the urban population percentage for a given 
district in the 2001 census. Villages and urban wards are stratified into three groups as done in 
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the 2001 census and the 50 PSU’s are allocated proportionately to the three strata. The household 
selections within each PSU is done using probability proportional size systematic sampling.20 
This sampling technique is implemented in order to ensure households are selected randomly 
into PSU’s. The survey is initially conducted at the household level, thus the data is reshaped for 
each individual to be a unit of observation. This means that each observation is not independent 
and identically distributed; the likelihood of an individual to be sampled into the survey depends 
on the sampling of the household as a whole. Therefore the individuals used for the analysis is 
restricted those coded as children who are between the ages of 5 and 18, which are school 
attending years.  
As shown in Table 2, the distribution of the sample population of children across 
different castes remain consistent between 2004 and 2008. SC and ST children make up less than 
20% of the total sample in both years, but the large sample size allows the model to estimate the 
relationship with sufficient power. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Caste by Year 
Caste 2004 2008 
SC 6,765 6,643 
ST 2,869 3,197 
OBC 15,392 17,282 
Other 8,978 4,820 
Missing 329 310 
Total 34,333 32,252 
 
Education attainment of children is measured by the years of schooling completed. The 
households in the survey are identified by religion and caste, which allows analysis of education 
level in relation to specific caste-based reservations. Additional information regarding household 
decisions regarding education and education attainment, namely the main reason for not 
attending school and reason for never attending school, will be used to inform the discussion of 
the analysis. 
The data for GP presidencies reservations is publically available online on Professor 
Thad Dunning’s website.21 The data set includes presidency and vice presidency reservations 
from 1993, 2000, 2002, 2005, and 2007 by GP, as well as population data for each GP derived 
from the 2001 census. In order to take into account the discrepancies in the number of GPs in 
each taluk, the sum of reservation frequencies is divided by the number of GPs in the taluk to 
create reservation rates at the taluk level. As the households in DLHS cannot be matched to 
specific GPs, new variables are generated to reflect the cumulative presidency reservations rates 
at the taluk level from two elections preceding each of the survey years. The cumulative 
reservation rates for 2004 is derived from 2000 and 2002 reservation rates, and 2005 and 2007 
reservation rates for 2008.  
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Treatment of Missing Data 
Initially, over 40% of the sample were missing years of schooling data in both waves of 
DLHS. However much of the missing data was a result of leading questions in the survey. Those 
who answered ‘no’ to ‘can you read and write’ in 2004 and ‘no’ to ‘have you ever been to 
school’ in 2008 were not asked about completed years of schooling, and were coded to be 
missing. Recoding these individuals to 0 years of schooling eliminated 46% of missing education 
attainment data for 2004 and 80% for 2008, as shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Initial Missing Years of Schooling 
2004 2008 
Literate Freq. Percent Ever been to school Freq. Percent 
No 3,571 46.64 No 2,323 80.86 
Yes 51 0.67 Yes 167 5.81 
Missing 4,035 52.7 Missing 383 13.33 
Total 7,657 100 Total 2,873 100 
 
Table 4. Missing Data 
  2004 2008 
Variable Caste Missing Total % Missing Missing Total % Missing 
Years of Schooling all 4,086 34,333 11.90 550 32,252 1.71 
Years of Schooling SC 861 6,765 12.73 106 6,643 1.60 
Years of Schooling ST 381 2,869 13.28 70 3,197 2.19 
Taluk all 10,976 34,333 31.97 907 32,252 2.81 
Taluk SC 1,715 6,765 25.35 161 6,643 2.42 
Taluk ST 525 2,869 18.30 22 3,197 0.69 
 
However there were no clear explanations regarding the over 30% of the respondents in 
2004 that are omitted due to missing taluk data used for matching the reservation rate to 
education attainment. Table 5 shows a logistic prediction of missing taluk data using all districts, 
year, age, gender, and caste. Only the districts that predict the missingness of taluk identifiers are 
included in the table. Twelve of the twenty seven districts are shown to significantly predict 
missing taluk identifiers, with districts of Dharwad and Bangalore (districts coded 9 and 20) 
having the largest odds of missing taluk information. While this is not ideal for a comprehensive 
analysis, a sufficient number of respondents are matched from the other districts in 2004, and 






Table 5. Predicting Missing Taluks 
Districts 4 -0.458*** 
  (0.0884) 
 8 0.171** 
  (0.0852) 
 9 1.879*** 
  (0.0819) 
 12 0.146* 
  (0.0839) 
 14 -0.214** 
  (0.0903) 
 15 0.261*** 
  (0.0858) 
 16 -0.535*** 
  (0.104) 
 18 0.189** 
  (0.0899) 
 19 -0.0571 
  (0.0874) 
 20 3.817*** 
  (0.0956) 
 26 0.284*** 
  (0.0874) 
 27 0.220** 
  (0.0900) 
Year 2008  -3.276*** 
  (0.0435) 
Age  0.00247 
  (0.00294) 
Female  0.0348 
  (0.0232) 
SC  -0.447*** 
  (0.0312) 
ST  -0.943*** 
  (0.0515) 
Constant  -0.837*** 
  (0.0739) 
Observations 66,585 
Standard errors in parentheses  











The results of the regression model for SC and ST presidency reservations is show in 
Table 6. The model indicates that with a 100% increase in cumulative reservation rate for SC 
presidents, the SC children between ages 5 and 18 will be likely to have 6.5 more years 
completed in school, significant at the 1% level. Or in a more likely context for GPs, SC children 
from taluks with a 10% higher cumulative reservation rate for SC presidents are associated with 
0.65 more years completed in school. ST presidency reservations show a similar relationship 
with education attainment but at a smaller magnitude and statistical significance. A 10% increase 
in ST presidency reservation rate is associated with 0.1 more years of school for ST children. As 
expected older higher age and greater household asset wealth is associated in more years of 
schooling, while being female is associated with less years in school.  
  
Table 6. Years of Schooling 
  SC ST 
Reservation 6.552*** 1.228 
 (1.557) (2.993) 
Reservation by 2008 -7.072*** -3.127 
 (1.575) (3.001) 
Year 2008 3.041*** 1.162*** 
 (0.580) (0.345) 
Age 0.584*** 0.561*** 
 (0.00711) (0.0104) 
Female -0.235*** -0.255*** 
 (0.0531) (0.0793) 
Household Asset Index 0.477*** 0.522*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0408) 
Constant -5.857*** -3.557*** 
 (0.579) (0.370) 
Observations 9,367 4,452 
R-squared 0.449 0.432 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
 An interesting result is the estimation of years of schooling by the interaction of the 
cumulative reservation rate and indicator for 2008. The analysis suggests that the reservation rate 
in 2008 has a significant negative impact on the years of schooling. This may be attributable to 
sampling differences in the third wave of DLHS from 2008. Table 7 confirms this as the average 
years of schooling are compared by year for four different groups of taluks based on their 
cumulative reservation rates. After identifying the distribution of reservation rates for each year, 
those above the median are categorized as high, and those below as low. The four groups are 
created by the various category combinations: high-high, high-low, low-low, and low-high. The 
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first three group suggests that there seems to be an overall slight decrease in the average years of 
schooling from 2004 to 2008. However the low-high group shows a greater increase in average 
years of schooling over time, supporting the initial hypothesis that increasing reservation rates 
increases education attainment. Sampling differences between 2004 and 2008 thus likely 
explains the overall decrease in education attainment and the negative coefficient for the 
interaction term in the initial analysis. 
 
Table 7. Average Years of Schooling by Group 
  2004 2008 
Group Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
High-High 4.938 3.332 4.798 3.534 
High-Low 5.074 3.247 4.791 3.419 
Low-Low 5.027 3.132 4.993 3.437 





The analysis shows that higher cumulative reservation rate for SC GP presidents is 
associated with greater educational attainment for SC children at a significant level, and similar 
trends for ST reservations though at a statistically insignificant level. The estimation model is 
checked for robustness by estimating the effect of reservation rates on the number of total 
household members, which based on our motivating hypothesis should not be impacted 
significantly. The results of the robustness check is shown in Table 8. The ST reservation once 
again does not have a significant effect on household members. The SC reservation, however, 
seems to show a slightly significant negative association with total household members. While 
this relationship is statistically significant, it is in the opposite direction of the effect on education 
attainment, and is unlikely to be a confounding effect on the main analysis.  
DLHS 3 provides main reasons for household members that have never or no longer 
attend school. Although this information is only provided in 2008 and does not fully explain the 
households’ reason for the increase in education attainment shown through this paper, it can 
contribute to placing the results in more insightful context. For SC children never having 
attended school, the second most popular response following ‘other’ was ‘required for household 
work. The most commonly cited reason for ST children never having attended school was that 
education was not considered to be necessary. Both SC and ST children that are no longer 
attending school are doing so mainly due to the lack of interest in studies and requirement for 
household work. Further research would be necessary to uncover how much of these reasons for 
never or not currently attending school is underlined by a low perceived returns to education due 
to caste-based stereotypes. 
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Table 8. Total Household Members 
  SC ST 
Reservation -2.762** 1.090 
 (1.398) (2.624) 
Reservation in 2008 4.637*** 0.665 
 (1.416) (2.632) 
Year 2008 -1.904*** -0.695** 
 (0.522) (0.305) 
Age 0.00327 0.00164 
 (0.00631) (0.00925) 
Female 0.266*** 0.288*** 
 (0.0498) (0.0742) 
Household Asset Index 0.288*** 0.225*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0383) 
Constant 6.688*** 5.753*** 
 (0.519) (0.323) 
Observations 9,950 4,748 
R-squared 0.022 0.025 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
   
 While the analysis presents insight into the relationship between GP presidency 
reservations and children’s education attainment at the taluk level, the paper faces several 
limitations. As discussed in the previous section missing taluk information in the 2004 survey 
omitted nearly 30% of the respondents who are most concentrated in two districts. The large 
sample size and the close to complete taluk information for 2008 allows the analysis to estimate 
the relationship. However including the missing respondents would provide a much more 
accurate estimation, especially if the missing respondents’ education attainment change is 
significant. Secondly the apparent sampling differences between 2004 and 2008 hinders the 
ability to estimate the impact with greater certainty. Clarifying how the samples differ in the two 
survey waves demographically would allow the current analysis to be strengthened by including 
necessary weights for the respondents. Lastly the analysis is completed at the taluk level, 
evaluating the average impact rather than determining the true effect on individuals. Access to 
panel data with identifiers matching households to specific GPs would allow for estimation using 








 Researchers have shown political representation of socio-economically marginalized 
groups generate positive policy and welfare outcomes, and the presence of these leaders can 
impact children and students to improve educational aspirations, attainment, and performance 
through a role model effect. The results of the analysis in this paper suggest that increases in the 
presence SC and ST presidents in Gram Panchayats in Karnataka are associated with increases in 
education attainment among SC and ST children between the ages of 5 and 18. These findings 
can be strengthened through more thorough individual-level reservation and education data, and 
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